














While use of contract teachers provides a low-cost way to increase teacher numbers, it raises the 
quality concern that these less trained teachers may be less effective.  We estimate the causal 
contract-teacher effect on student achievement using school fixed effects  and  value-added 
models of the education production function, using Indian data. We allow for both homogenous 
and heterogeneous treatment effects, to highlight the mechanisms through which the contract 
teacher effect works. We also present school fixed effects teacher pay equations and predict 
achievement marks per Rupee spent on regular and contract teachers. We find that despite being 
paid just a third of the salary of regular teachers with similar observed characteristics, contract 
teachers produce higher student learning.  
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The relative effectiveness and costs of contract and regular teachers in India 
 
1.  Introduction 
A central plank of India’s primary school reforms in the past 15 years has been the provision of 
low-cost contract teachers, in official data called ‘para’ teachers. Use of contract teachers 
increased rapidly in India since the mid-1990s and there were 543,671 contract teachers in India 
in 2008-09
1
The officially stated rationale for provision of contract teachers is to achieve three major 
equity and efficiency aims in an affordable way: expanding access to schooling in unserved 
communities; eliminating  single-teacher schools and relieving multi-grade teaching; and 
reducing high pupil teacher ratios. Regular teacher pay scales are high. For instance, in Uttar 
Pradesh, the ratio of regular teacher pay to state per capita GDP was 7:1 in 2005 and since then 
regular teacher salaries have nearly doubled, following implementation of the Sixth Pay 
Commission’s recommendations (Kingdon, 2010). Nationally, contract teachers’ salary rate in 
2005 was on average about 35% of regular teachers’ pay rate, and this is likely to have fallen 
below 25% following Sixth Pay Commission related increases in regular teacher salaries 
(Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao, 2010).  Contract teacher schemes are favoured because they 
expand schooling access, increase teacher numbers, relieve multi-grade teaching and reduce 
class sizes in a fiscally manageable way. 
.   
Although the schemes vary across states, generally contract teachers have renewable 
(often annually renewable) contracts rather than regular teachers’ lifetime employment 
guarantees. They are usually not required to have pre-service teacher training and the educational 
                                                 
1 Authors’ calculations using the percentage of para-teachers in all schools (9.39%) and the total number of 
elementary school teachers (5,789,898) based on DISE (2009). 3 
 
qualification requirements for contract teachers are mostly lower than those for regular teachers. 
Finally, contract teachers are typically recruited and paid by the village local government, rather 
than being employed directly by the state government as regular teachers are.   
Given that teachers are the most important input into primary schools, the relative 
effectiveness of contract and regular teachers – and thus whether the government should fund 
contract teacher schemes or scrap them – is one of the most policy relevant and quality-focused 
issues in Indian basic education today. On the one hand, their use provides a low-cost way for 
the state to increase the number of teachers in the face of rising student populations, budgetary 
troubles and rapid real increases in salaries of regular teachers.  On the other, it raises 
educational quality and educational equity concerns
2.   The quality concern is the fear that these 
less trained and lower paid teachers may be less effective in imparting learning.  The (related) 
equity concern arises because contract teachers are often appointed in the remoter schools or in 
the ‘Education Guarantee’ schools that serve poorer children (e.g. child labourers, small-
habitations or tribal children), raising the fear that poorer children are potentially  being 
condemned to lower quality teachers, exacerbating social inequality
3
The relative effectiveness of regular and contract teachers is not obvious, since 
international research fails to show a consistent positive association between certification 
(teacher education, training), tenure and salary on the one hand and student achievement on the 
other (Hanushek, 2003).  Moreover, even if lower education, training and salary reduce contract 
teachers’ effectiveness, there may be compensating positive effects: being appointed by village 
local government, contract teachers are likely to be more locally accountable than regular 
teachers.  Further, contract teachers may have greater incentive to apply effort to ensure contract 
.   
                                                 
2 Govinda and Josephine (2004), Kumar, et al (2001) 
3 Drèze and Sen (2002), Leclercq (2002) 4 
 
renewal, unlike regular teachers whose tenures are secure, especially given a high graduate 
unemployment rate of 11%
4
Since the early 2000s, the effectiveness of contract and regular teachers in India has 
attracted research interest (Pratichi Trust, 2002; Leclercq, 2002; Govinda and Josephine, 2004; 
EdCil, 2007, NCAER, 2008).  Using descriptive statistics these studies find that achievement 
and/or attendance levels of children taught by contract and regular teachers were similar. Sankar 
(2008a) fits OLS child achievement regressions for three Indian states (Andhra, Madhya Pradesh 
and Uttar Pradesh) and after controlling for children’s home background, finds no significant 
difference between the learning levels of students taught by contract and regular teachers. 
However,  in an OLS equation, the contract teacher dummy variable is likely endogenous, 
yielding biased estimates of the contract teacher ‘effect’. Goyal and Pandey (2009) and Kingdon 
and Sipahimalani Rao (2010) find that contract teachers have significantly higher effort 
(attendance rate and time on teaching task) than regular teachers within the same school, i.e. 
when the potentially non-random matching of contract teachers to particular schools on the basis 
of their unobserved characteristics is taken account of. Finally, Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
(2009) use experimental data from Andhra Pradesh to find that the provision of a contract 
teacher in randomly selected 100 treatment schools led to child test scores that were higher by 
0.15 SD in maths and 0.09 SD in language, compared to those in control schools. However, in 
their paper, the contract teacher effect appears to be indistinguishable from the effect of the 
 and paucity of well-remunerated employment.  In sum, it cannot be 
presumed that contract teachers are necessarily less effective in imparting learning than regular 
teachers.  Moreover, the employment of contract teachers is expected to lead to a reduction of 
pupil teacher ratios and to relieve multi-grade teaching, and this may be conducive to greater 
learning. Their relative effectiveness is thus an empirical issue worthy of examination. 
                                                 
4 Based on our analysis of Indian National Sample Survey (2004-05). 5 
 
reduction in class size that accompanies the provision of an extra contract teacher
5
The current paper attempts to shed further light on the contract teacher effect in India 
using a unique rich dataset collected by Kingdon, Banerji and Chaudhari (2008). We tested the 
learning achievement level of individual children in two grades (grades 2 and 4), in two subjects 
(maths and language) and at two points in time (start and end of the school year). We also have 
matched data on the characteristics of the teacher that taught a given grade a given subject most 
through the year (by head-teacher’s report). This data permits estimation of the contract teacher 
effect at the student level using school fixed effects models and value added models, and it 
permits us to control for class-size, multi-grade teaching and pedagogical style, which allow us 
to get closer to the causal contract teacher effect. In addition, the use of a saturated model of the 
achievement production function, allows us to look at how the contract teacher effect works by 
allowing heterogeneity of treatment. Section 2 sets out the methodology and data used. Section 3 
presents the results and the last section concludes. 
.  A 
randomized trial that has the power to estimate the pure contract teacher effect requires one of 
the following: (a) an additional treatment group who were allocated an extra regular teacher (to 
act as the comparator for the group that were allocated an extra contract teacher),  (b)  the 
replacement of a regular teacher with a contract teacher (which would leave class-sizes 
unchanged), or (c) the random allocation of pupils to contract and regular teachers within a grade 
after the hiring of additional teachers.  In the spirit of (c), Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2009) 
exploit random allocation of teachers across grade 1 classes following the hiring of contract 
teachers in Kenya, to isolate a contract teacher effect. They find that pupils assigned to contract 
teachers score significantly higher than those assigned to regular teachers. 
                                                 
5 In addition the authors find that the size of the contract teacher  effect is greater in the lower than in higher grades, 
where they also find the reduction in class-size to be greatest. 6 
 
1  Data and methodology  
1.1  Data 
The data used in this paper come from the SchoolTells survey of primary schools in two north 
Indian states: Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. These are two of the most educationally challenged states 
of India. The SchoolTells survey was carried out in the 2007-08 school year in 160 rural primary 
schools across 10 districts of the sample states. It yielded achievement data on over 4000 
students of grades 2 and 4 and on their teachers and schools. Each school was visited four times 
in the school year. Students were tested in language and maths at the start and end of the school 
year, approximately nine months apart. Although the survey included 35 private schools, we 
have used only government schools in the analysis in this paper as contract teachers are used 
only in government-funded schools. The survey provides an unusually rich source of data with 
detailed questions on the children’s personal traits (age, gender, height, illness); family 
background (caste, religion, parental education, household asset ownership); teacher 
characteristics (qualifications, training, gender, age, regular/contract status, absence rate and time 
on task); and a wide range of school quality factors. Given high teacher absence rates in north 
Indian schools (Kremer, et al, 2005), children in a given grade are often taught by a teacher other 
than the one assigned to teach them. In matching students to teachers, we rely on the head-
teacher’s report of which teacher teaches a given subject to class 2 and class 4 the most during 
the year. 
The same achievement test was used for students of grades 2 and 4. It tested 
competencies that span the kind of material children encounter in the textbooks of grades 2 
through 4. It was understood that most children in grade 2 may not be able to do the more 
difficult questions. The same type of achievement test with the same competencies tested was 7 
 
used in time period 2 (near the end of the school year) as in time period 1 (at the start of the 
school year).  
To render achievement level comparable across subjects, grades and time periods, we 
converted absolute achievement scores into z-scores. The distribution of absolute marks in maths 
and language (grades 2 and 4 and both time-periods taken together) is shown in Figure 1. 
Appendix Table 1 sets out the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of student achievement 
Figure 1 is striking due to the severe left hand skewness of the distribution or marks, 
especially in UP. Given that the figures show marks for both grades 2 and 4, one would expect a 
bi-modal distribution, instead, the majority of marks are distributed towards the left of the graph, 
with a very long tale. The situation is starker for mathematics than for language achievement. 
The exception to this is language scores in Bihar, which are less skewed.  The figure suggests 
that learning levels are very low and do not improve much between grades, a cause of real 
concern. Such low levels of achievement are not confined to our sample, with the Annual Status 
of Education (ASER 2009) finding that only 37.6% of grade 4 children in India can read a grade 
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1.2  Differences between regular and contract teachers  
Before examining the main question, we present some descriptive statistics (Table 1) to 
highlight key differences between teacher types, and contractual differences across states. In UP 
contract teacher jobs are annually renewable while in Bihar they are jobs for life, leading to 
Bihar teachers facing weaker accountability pressures than UP contract teachers.  
 In both states contract teachers are noticeably younger than regular teachers, and this is 
also partly reflected in their tenures. In Bihar a far higher proportion of contract than regular 
teachers are female but in UP the proportions are similar. Salary differences are stark: contract 
teachers earn only a quarter as much as regular teachers in UP and a third as much in Bihar, 
reflecting extreme pay inequality. Despite commonly held notions, regular teachers do not have 
higher educational qualifications than contract teachers; indeed the opposite is true in UP. In 
Bihar a higher proportion of contract than regular teachers passed higher secondary exams with 
first-division marks. However, while the majority of regular teachers have received teacher 
training (95% in UP, 84% in Bihar), far fewer contract teachers have done so.  
On teacher effort, contract teachers have roughly half the  absence rates of  regular 
teachers in UP but in Bihar contract teachers’ absence rates are weakly higher than those of 
regular teachers (many of the contract teachers appointed in 2006 or later in Bihar were not local 
to the school, and Bihar contract teachers do not face annually renewable jobs).  In both states, 
contract teachers spend a significantly higher proportion of their time teaching (84% compared 
to 75%), and are more likely to support weak children with their studies (15 [32] % of contract 
teachers report doing so in UP [Bihar] compared to 8 [15] % of regular teachers). 
1.3  Methodology 
An ideal method for impact evaluation of contract teachers would be a randomized trial 
with children randomly assigned to contract and regular teachers within a school. However, in 9 
 
general education authorities are not amenable to such an approach, and furthermore while this 
would give us an estimate of the effect of contract teachers, it sheds no light on why this effect 
exists. While propensity score matching methods may be used to create artificial comparator 
units, such an approach controls only for the observed differences between children taught by 
contract and regular teachers. In the absence of an ideal methodology, we use a number of other 
econometric techniques in the context of an achievement production function.   
We begin with the conventional OLS baseline where we specify an achievement 
production function of the form: 
(1) Aijkl = α + βFCi +δSCj +λTCk +ε
Where the achievement level (A
ijkl 
ijkl) of the i
th student in l
th subject in the j
th school with the k
th 
An important problem for identifying a causal contract teacher effect is that assignment 
of teachers to schools may not be random, as contract teachers are often posted to more remote 
schools. As we have variation of teachers within schools (each child is observed in two separate 
subjects, and within each school there are data on two grades), we can use School Fixed Effects 
estimation to control for the non-random matching of children and teachers to particular schools 
that may be more or less likely to have contract teachers. Here, identification of the contract 
teacher effect comes only from within-school differences in teacher type, i.e. the approach 
controls for observed and unobserved school factors that affect student achievement and thus 
reduces endogeneity bias. We specify an equation of the form:  
teacher is determined by the vector of his/her personal and family background characteristics 
(FC), school characteristics (SC) and teacher characteristics (TC). The vector of teacher 
characteristics contains our variable of interest, the contractual state of the teacher, in addition to 
his/her age, qualifications and gender.  10 
 




Even after controlling for all observed and unobserved school characteristics, our 
estimate of the contract teacher effect may be biased due to the potential non-random matching 
of teachers to pupils within a school. This is possible across grades, but not within grades (as 
each school only has one class per grade). If this is the case, teachers of certain type may match 
to children of higher ability, e.g. by teaching the grade they perceive as having the more able 
children. To address this possibility, and as each child was tested twice in our sample (at the start 
and end of the school year), we estimate a  value-added  School Fixed Effects  model  of the 
achievement production function. This regresses ‘change in achievement’ over the school-year 
on teacher type (teacher-type assignment for a given subject does not change over the school 
year), as follows:  
captures  observed and unobserved school-level characteristics,  which do not vary 
within schools.  
(3) [ Aijkl, t+1- Aijkl,t ]  = α + βFCi + λTCk + (µj+ εikl)
Where (A
  
ijkl, t+1-   Aijkl, t ) denotes changes in the achievement level of the i
th student in the j
th 
school with the k
th 
After estimating the causal impact of contract teachers we try to explain our findings, 
using two different approaches. Firstly, we look at the impact that contract teachers have on 
reducing class-size and alleviating multi-grade teaching, and ask if the contract teacher effect is 
really a class-size effect. Secondly we use measures of teacher effort to investigate the 
proposition that renewable contracts induce higher levels of teacher effort.  
teacher between time t and t+1, that is the start and the end of the school year.  
A notable drawback of these models  is that we identify the average treatment effect 
(ATE) under the assumption of homogeneity of treatment. While it is possible that the impact of 11 
 
contract teachers on achievement is constant over pupil  types and across different school 
scenarios, one can also imagine situations where contract teachers will work well in certain 
scenarios, and less in others. As such, the contract teacher effect is likely to be heterogeneous 
across scenarios, and this variation is unlikely to be uncorrelated with anything of interest. As 
Deaton (2010) points out, it is exactly this variation which will illuminate our enquiry. So finally 
we allow for  heterogeneous  treatment effects across observable characteristics by  using a 
saturated model, as suggested by Derecho and Glewwe (2002).  
In  a saturated model our estimations include both observed characteristics and their 
interaction with the contract teacher variable. By introducing interaction terms between our 
variable of interest (contract teacher dummy variable), and mean-centred values of all other 
observable characteristics, we control for all heterogeneous treatment effects and can estimate 
the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of being taught by a contract teacher after controlling for 
all possible heterogeneity of treatment. A child with characteristics that are exactly average, in 
the average school with a teacher with average characteristics, will not deviate from the mean 
value for any variable – therefore all variables will equal zero with the exception of the contract 
teacher variable. However, the ATE may not be particularly applicable in this context given the 
non-randomised nature of contract teacher appointments and differences in characteristics by 
teacher type. We are not interested in the average teacher, rather the effect of contract teachers 
given the interactions between teacher characteristics and contractual status. In a true randomised 
trial this information is embodied in the treatment effect, so to accurately compare our findings 
we cannot purely focus on an ATE that is independent of these interactions. By allowing for 
heterogeneous treatment effects this method allows us to see the pathways through which the 
contract teacher effect works and identify the differences in characteristics which influence the 12 
 
results. It is the findings regarding the heterogeneity of treatment, rather than the ATE itself, 
which offers  the most valuable information with regards how contract teachers impact on 
learning and the likely effects of future contract teacher appointments. A full derivation of the 
model can be found in Appendix 2. 
We are estimating the achievement equations on a  sample of children  enrolled  in 
government schools only and,  in principle, this could be a selected sample (both due to 
selectivity into enrolment and into government schools). Using the Heckman approach, selection 
into government school was modelled using the existence of a private school in the village as the 
identifying exclusion restriction.  We found weak negative selection into government schools but 
our estimated contract teacher effects were not significantly affected by selectivity bias.  
Given the dominance of low scores in our data-set, and the  skewness of the test-score 
distribution, our estimations are likely to suffer from heteroskedasticity. A consequence of this is 
that our inference is likely to be inefficient as our standard errors are too high, so we will 
understate significance. Given our high number of observations (8,185 falling to 3942 in the 
value-added specification) this is unlikely to be much of a problem
6
2   Findings 
. We use clustering at the 
school level in our OLS equations to address  heteroskedastcitiy. We  also try an alternative 
functional form of the dependent variable (namely the log of test scores), which are more 
normally distributed, and the results were largely unaffected.   
Due to some potentially important differences between the contracts of para teachers in 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, we estimate the achievement model for each state separately.  
                                                 
6 An alternative would be to estimate a non-linear model, such as a count model; however we then lose the ability to 
use the school fixed effects estimator since a true fixed effects estimator for the negative binomial
6 model does not 
exist (Allison and Waterman 2002). As such, we prefer the linear estimator and accept the resulting inefficiency. 13 
 
Uttar Pradesh  
The main results for UP are presented in Table 2. The model pools both subjects (Hindi 
and Maths), both grades (2 and 4) and both time periods (i.e. surveys at the start and end of the 
school year) and we therefore include controls for subject, grade and time period. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is the overall z-score of achievement, using the mean of achievement 
test score in both subjects, for both grades and both time periods.  
Our variable of main interest is the contractual status of the teacher (contract teacher=1; 
regular teacher=0). Columns 1 and 2 provide the OLS baseline and columns 3 and 4 present 
School Fixed Effects (FE) estimation. School FE implies within-school estimation where all 
school level factors (observed and unobserved) that influence student achievement, are 
controlled for. Thus school FE estimation corrects for any bias due to the potentially non-random 
assignment of contract teachers to particular schools. OLS and school FE equations are presented 
with and without controls, to highlight the effect  –  on the main variable of interest –  of 
conditioning on teacher and school characteristics.     
We briefly discuss other results before turning to our main variable of interest. In the 
OLS equation (column 2), school resources and textbook provision have large and statistically 
significant associations with child test scores, but mid-day meals and class size do not. However, 
these results do not represent causal effects. Looking at the school FE results, pupil achievement 
improves between grades: on average children in grade 4 score about half a SD higher than those 
in grade 2 (the base category). Boys outperform girls by 0.15 SD, a noticeable amount given that 
any selection bias in school enrolment is likely to favour girls’ scores. Healthier children do 
better (as in Kingdon and Monk, 2010). Parental education and wealth (as measured by asset 14 
 
ownership) are significant predictors of achievement and private tuition
7
In the school fixed-effects regression, male teachers  lower  achievement by 0.13  SD 
compared to being taught by a female teacher. Teachers with BA or higher qualifications have 
better performing  pupils than those with only higher secondary qualifications or less (base 
category), but there is no discernable difference between teachers with Bachelor’s and Master’s 
qualifications. A teacher who completed his/her Higher Secondary exams in the first division (a 
proxy for the teacher’s own cognitive skills) has higher performing pupils. We have not included 
the pre-service teacher training variable as that is highly collinear with the contract teacher 
dummy, the variable of most interest.
 has strong effects, with 
children who receive external tutoring scoring over a quarter of a SD higher than those who do 
not.  
8
Turning our focus to the primary question of this paper – the relative effectiveness of 
contract and regular teachers – it is seen that in the OLS achievement equation without controls 
(column 1), the contract teacher variable has a negative though insignificant coefficient but that 
the introduction of teacher and school characteristics in column 2 reverses the sign. A similar 
story emerges when moving from column 3 to 4, which introduces teacher characteristics in a 
school-fixed effects framework. The increase in the coefficient on the contract teacher variable 
when moving from OLS (across-school) to school fixed effects (within-school) estimation is 
unsurprising: the OLS coefficient on the contract teacher variable is downward biased since 
  
                                                 
7 Private tuition is privately tutored paid lessons taken outside of school, usually in the evenings. They are a fee-
paying service conducted by independent tutors (i.e. not their school teacher).  
8 When we estimate using teacher training as an additional control (shown in Appendix 3) we find the contract 
teacher effect reduces somewhat (from 0.20 to 0.16 SD), and pupils of trained teachers surprisingly  have 
significantly lower achievement (-0.19 SD). One would expect training to improve performance, thus teacher 
training here is most likely picking up differences in behaviour between teacher types, which are collinear with 
contractual status. As such, we prefer estimates without the training variable.   
 15 
 
contract teachers are generally more likely to be assigned to communities where households are 
more deprived. The correlation between ‘proportion of para teachers in a school’ and household 
wealth of children in the school is -0.16 and this is highly statistically significant (p=0.000)
9
After controlling for observed teacher characteristics and for all observed and unobserved 
school characteristics (column 4), contract teachers raise child test scores by about 0.21 SD 
compared to being taught by a regular teacher
. In 
other words, in across-school estimation, the contract teacher variable is partly ‘picking up’ the 
effect of community’s deprivation.  
10
Table 3
. Here our identification comes from two sources: 
differences in teacher type across grades (2 and 4) and across subjects (maths and language, 
within the same grade).   shows the exact breakdown of the contract teacher effect by its 
constituent  parts. Columns (2) and (3) estimate the contract teacher effect from  within-
subject/across-grade differences in teacher type, where a contract teacher teaches the subject to 
grade 2 while the regular teacher teaches the same subject to grade 4 (or vice-versa). Column (4) 
identifies effects from across subject/within grade differences in teacher type, where pupils are 
taught by a regular teacher for one subject and a contract teacher for the other.  We report this for 
grade 4 only, as there is insufficient variation in teacher-type across subject in grade 2 to draw 
meaningful conclusions. Unfortunately this lack of variation means that in a pupil-fixed effects 
equation (estimated but not shown) the contract teacher effect could not be identified.  
The estimated effect in column (1) is a weighted average of columns (2)-(4), with the 
majority of the variation being across grades
11
                                                 
9 At the child level, those taught by contract teachers are more deprived:  the t-value of the contract-regular teacher 
difference in maternal years of education is 6.0, in paternal education is 6.9 and in household wealth is 2.9. 
. Estimating the model using only across-grade 
10 This result is robust to changes in functional form (not shown). The contract teacher effect using the z-score of log 
of subject marks produces a significant contract teacher effect of 0.24 SD.   
11 Results from grade 2 only are excluded as only 4% of pupils are taught by a contract teacher in one subject and a 
regular teacher in another. In contrast, approximately 65% of schools have within-subject across grade variation in 
teacher type.   16 
 
variation yields estimates of a  contract teacher effect of 0.289 SD for reading scores and 0.163 
SD for maths scores, while using only across subject variation within grade 4 (last column) 
shows a slight positive, but insignificant contract teacher effect. However, identification here 
comes from a small percentage of children (12%) who are taught by contract teachers in one 
subject and regular teachers in the other.  
Bihar 
Having presented the results for UP, we now turn to the state of Bihar. The main results 
are presented in Table 4. There are strong achievement differences between grades in Bihar, with 
pupils in grade 4 scoring 1.023 SD higher than those in grade 2.
12
In the school FE achievement equation  conditioning on teacher characteristics, the 
contract teacher variable has a positive and weakly significant coefficient: pupils of contract 
teachers score 0.069 SD higher than their regular teacher counterparts in the same school. This 
effect is substantially smaller than in UP (0.208),  possibly due to contract teachers facing lower 
 The differential between maths 
and language scores is also greater in Bihar, at nearly 0.20 SD (compared to 0.06 in UP). The 
gender gap is also nearly double, with boys outperforming girls within the same school by 0.26 
SD. Measures of child health are significantly related to cognitive outcomes, as are household 
wealth, parental education and taking private tuition.  Teacher characteristics other than age and 
gender are insignificantly correlated with student achievement.  
                                                 
12 This is double the achievement differential found in UP, suggesting a higher relative rate of learning between 
grades in Bihar than in UP (the level of learning is also higher in Bihar than in UP, see Appendix 1; this is also 
corroborated in the national ASER survey (2009) and in the NCERT survey (2005)). A potential explanation this is 
that Bihar students are much more likely to take private tuition (40% of the sample compared to 4% in UP). Another 
possible explanation is that while much of the cognitive skills tests are pitched at the grade 4 level of difficulty, in 
UP grade 4 pupils are more akin to grade 2 pupils in terms of their level of competency and that is why they exhibit 
lower levels of achievement growth – because the test is too difficult for them – while in Bihar grade 4 children are 
at the grade 4 level of competency and thus exhibit the sort of gain in learning over the school year that one might 
expect from a grade 4 child. 17 
 
accountability pressures Bihar, where they have jobs for life (as opposed to annually renewable 
contracts in UP).  
Thus, our results suggest that contract teachers are substantially more effective than 
regular teachers in UP, and weakly more effective than regular teachers in Bihar
13
3  Why are contract teachers more effective than regular teachers? 
. We now turn 
to the question of why this is the case and ask whether our estimated para teacher effect could be 
biased due to non-random matching of teachers to pupils within schools.  
We investigate three possible reasons why contract teachers may be more effective than 
regular teachers: (a) that our results are spurious,  being biased due to non-random matching of 
teachers to pupils within schools; (b) that the appointment of contract teachers may lead to lower 
class sizes and/or reduced incidence of multi-grade teaching, so that it in fact represents a class-
size effect; and (c) that contract teachers may exhibit more effort or differing classroom styles 
due to the insecure nature of their contracts and their consequent higher accountability than 
regular teachers. 
3.1  Non-random matching of teachers to more able pupils within schools  
Even in within-school estimation, the contract teacher variable is potentially endogenous 
if there is non-random matching of teachers to pupils. Non-random matching within each grade 
is not possible in this sample (and in the majority of government of India primary schools) as 
each grade has only one class, and indeed many schools have fewer  teachers than classes, 
leading to multi-grade teaching. So it is not possible for a regular (or contract teacher) to select 
                                                 
13 In addition, in Bihar a court ruling in 2006 stipulated that applicants with teacher training certificates should be 
given preference in contract teacher appointments even if they did not live locally (to the school). We can consider 
those appointed in 2006 and with training as a separate group to those who were appointed either pre-2006 or in 
2006 without training. Re-estimating the model (shown in appendix 4) we find statistically no difference in the 
relative effectiveness of contract teachers with and without pre-service training.   
 18 
 
which class they wish to teach within each grade. It is however possible that there is non-random 
matching of teachers to grades. If this is the case, and there are differences in pupils’ ability 
across grades, then it may be possible that our school fixed effects estimates are biased. Given 
the high attrition of students in India (the drop-out rates at the end of grades 2 & 3 in UP are 10 
and 12.7% respectively
14) and the fact that more able students are likely to continue in schools, 
the average grade 4 pupil is likely to be more innately able than the average pupil in grade 2. 
This could bias our estimates if teachers can select which grades they teach. In UP however, 
there is a stipulation that contract teachers teach grades 1 and 2, while regular teachers teach 
grades 3, 4 and 5, which suggests that our estimated contract teacher effect is, if anything, biased 
downwards since contract teachers in fact teach grade 2 children who are likely to be less able, 
on average, than the grade 4 children that are supposed to be taught by regular teachers. Even if 
this stipulation was ignored and teachers could match to particular grades, the greater status of 
regular teachers makes it highly unlikely that contract teachers would be able to match to the 
more able grade/pupils.  Nevertheless,  to address the  worry  that contract teachers may  still 
somehow be matched with abler students even within a school, we re-estimate the model as a 
school fixed effects value-added model of achievement, where the dependent variable is the z-
score of ‘change in absolute pupil achievement in a subject over the school year’. This tells us 
how contract teachers affect the growth of cognitive skills over the school year. A value-added 
model greatly reduces the endogeneity problem without necessarily eliminating it.
15
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  Before 
presenting the results of the value-added model, we first discuss class-size as a factor that 
potentially confounds the contract teacher effect. 
15 Since children with higher initial ability not only have higher levels of achievement, but may also have greater 
changes in achievement over time.  19 
 
3.2  Changes in class-size and multi-grade teaching  
In addition to non-random matching of teachers to more able students, it is possible that 
they are also matching to classes which are perceived to be easier to teach, such as smaller 
classes and mono-grade classes. As with ability bias, this type of non-random matching is likely 
if anything to lead to an underestimation of the contract teacher effect, since regular teachers 
(being longer-serving, permanent and far better-paid employees) are the more likely to match to 
the smaller and to the mono-grade classes.   
However, there may be reason to worry that the contract teacher ‘effect’ is in fact a class-
size effect. The provision of contract teachers may have beneficial effects on child learning by 
lowering pupil-teacher ratios and reducing or eliminating multi-grade teaching. Indeed, this is 
one of the officially stated rationales for the hiring of contract teachers. Schools with more 
contract teachers can be expected to have lower pupil-teacher ratios and use more mono-grade 
teaching. Table 6 shows the school-level correlation between the number of contract teachers in 
a school on the one hand, and pupil-teacher ratio and multi-grade teaching, on the other. Given 
the marked difference between the official pupil-teacher ratio (defined as the ratio of the total 
number of enrolled pupils to appointed teachers in the school) and the actual observed pupil-
teacher ratio (defined as the number of teachers and pupils present when the school was visited), 
we report both measures. A school is defined as being multi-grade when the number of classes 
observed was less than the number of grades in the school. Table 6 shows that in Bihar, number 
of contract teachers in a school is significantly negatively correlated with the incidence of multi-
grade teaching. It also shows that the number of contract teachers in a school is significantly 
negatively correlated with both the official and the actual pupil-teacher ratio in both states, 
suggesting that schools with higher numbers of contract teachers do indeed have lower class 
sizes. However, the correlation of the ‘number of contract teachers appointed to a school’ with 20 
 
official pupil-teacher ratio is higher than its correlation with the actual pupil-teacher ratio in both 
states. This suggests that the appointment of extra contract teachers does not lead to a 
corresponding reduction in actual pupil-teacher ratios, presumably as it leads to higher teacher 
absence rates. This is similar to the findings for Kenya in Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2009), 
where the appointment of contract teachers led to an increase in the absence of regular teachers.  
Is it the case then that the estimated contract teacher effect is really an effect of reduced 
class-size and improved classroom organisation? This would lead to an over-estimate of the 
contract teacher effect. In contrast, if regular teachers are matching to smaller or mono-grade 
classes then this will bias our estimates downwards.  
Table  7  shows the results of a model which controls for both:  possible bias due to 
matching to more able pupils, and the influence of class-size and mono-grade teaching. Columns 
(1) to (3) use school fixed effects and include controls for class-size and mono-grade teaching. 
We can control for actual class-size and mono-grade even within a school as these can vary 
between grades. Columns (4) – (6) estimate the value-added school fixed effects model, using 
the z-score of ‘change in achievement over the school year’. The class-size (pupil-teacher ratio, 
PTR) effect is weakly significant with a small coefficient in the fixed effects estimation (columns 
2) in both states. Mono-grade teaching has a large positive association with achievement in UP 
(column 3), but is perversely negative in Bihar. Most importantly for our question, neither the 
inclusion of class size,  nor of control for mono-grade teaching, significantly changes the 
coefficient of the contract teacher variable.  Thus, while contract teachers lower class-size (in 
both states) and lessen multi-grade teaching (in Bihar), this does not appear to be driving the 
contract teacher effect.  21 
 
When we estimate a school fixed effects model of value-added in achievement in the last 
three columns of Table 7, we find contract teachers to have a positive significant effect on 
changes in achievement over the school year, of a very similar magnitude to the non-value added 
specification. This is true in both states, but the decrease in precision of the estimates means the 
effect is insignificant in Bihar. While it does not eliminate bias, a value-added model greatly 
reduces it. The results suggest that endogenous matching of contract teachers to more able pupils 
is unlikely to be driving the the positive contract teacher effect.  
3.3  Changes in teacher effort 
An additional possible explanation of the contract teacher effect is that contract teachers, due to 
their short-term insecure contracts which can be terminated, face greater accountability pressures 
and thus exhibit more effort than regular teachers.  One way of measuring teacher effort is 
through the teachers’ absence rate. Certainly in UP contract teachers display noticeably higher 
effort, via lower (about half) absence rates than regular teachers.  In Table 8  we re-estimate the 
school-fixed effect achievement equation (from Column 4 of Table 2) but now also control for a 
number of measures of teacher effort, including whether or not they report spending time 
supporting weak children and the proportion of time they spend in beneficial activities in the 
average school day. Given the weak significance of the contract teacher effect in Bihar, we 
report estimates for UP only, though inclusion of teacher effort measures has similar effects in 
Bihar as in UP. Each additional control is evaluated first without teacher type (columns 2, 4 and 
6) and then with teacher type (columns 3, 5 and 7).    
Table 8  shows that the contract teacher effect is very robust to inclusion of controls for 
teacher effort. Statistically there is no difference among the point estimates  between all 22 
 
specifications. This result is robust to allowing non-linearities in the relationship between teacher 
effort and achievement (not shown).  
Column (2) shows that children whose teacher is absent more frequently score lower. 
Including both teacher absence and the contract teacher variable, we find the coefficient on 
absence halves (from -0.125 to -0.0595) but the contract teacher effect falls only slightly and 
remains significant. This can arise if variation in absence rates in mostly across-teacher types, 
rather than within-teacher types.  
Column (4) reports the effect of teacher’s time-on-task. The measure used is a composite 
index, as detailed in the note to Table 8. The variable itself is insignificantly associated with 
child achievement and its inclusion does not change the contract teacher effect substantially or 
statistically significantly.  Column (6) shows that child achievement benefits  strongly  from 
having a teacher who supports weak pupils, as explained in Table  8.  The  effect diminishes 
slightly when we control for teacher type (column 7), as contract teachers are more likely to 
report supporting weak pupils (17% compared to 6% for regular teachers)
16
We conclude that the positive contract teacher effect is not explained by the dimensions 
of teacher effort that are available in our data set
. This is consistent 
with Bourdon et al.’s (2007) finding that contract teachers are particularly effective when 
teaching lower ability pupils. Importantly for our main question, inclusion of this measure of 
teacher effort does not reduce the contract teacher effect. 
17
                                                 
16 Our conclusions are hindered by the fact this is self-reported data, but it is unclear why contract teachers should be 
more likely to report this than regular teachers. 
. One potential explanation of the contract 
teacher effect is as follows: the lower salaries of contract teachers may imply that only persons 
17 Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2010) find that a teacher performance pay program in Kenya did not increase teacher 
effort in many obvious dimensions. For instance, teachers in program schools were not more likely to be in school, 
or assign homework or adopt different pedagogical practices, but they increased their test preparation sessions. 
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intrinsically motivated towards teaching children take these low paid jobs, whereas regular 
teachers are individuals who are attracted more by the high salaries of regular teacher posts but 
have less intrinsic motivation for teaching. However, the activities inspired by any such higher 
motivation of contract teachers  (that lead them to be more effective as teachers) are  not 
adequately captured in the measures of teacher effort available to us. 
4  Heterogeneous treatment effects of contract teachers  
The previous models have shown that the contract teacher effect is both positive and 
robust. While it is possible that these effects are driven by unobserved characteristics of contract 
teachers, notably higher non-measurable aspects of effort, it is also possible that it partly due to 
the treatment effect being heterogeneous across observable characteristics of teachers and pupils.  
To investigate this, we estimate a saturated model, where our estimations include both observed 
characteristics, and their interaction with the contract teacher variable. By introducing interaction 
terms between our variable of interest (contract teacher dummy variable), and mean-centred 
values of all other observable characteristics, we can estimate the Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) of being taught by a contract teacher (see methodology section) after allowing treatment 
to differ by observed characteristics. A child with characteristics that are exactly average, in the 
average school with a teacher with average characteristics, will not deviate from the mean value 
for any variable –  therefore all variables will equal zero with the exception of the contract 
teacher variable.  
In addition to this, the coefficients on the interaction terms tell us how contract teachers 
affect child learning given different observed characteristics of pupils and teachers. A significant 
coefficient on the interaction between contract teacher variable and a given child characteristic 
indicates that the contract teacher effect differs by child characteristic.  Similarly a significant 24 
 
coefficient on the interaction between the contract teacher variable and any given teacher 
characteristic indicates that the  contract  teacher effect differs by the characteristics of the 
teachers in the school. Thus, the interaction terms  allow us to identify the scenarios where 
contract teachers are likely to have a positive effect. 
In both UP and Bihar the ATE of the contract teacher variable is small and statistically 
insignificant. However our true treatment effect is the ATE plus the heterogeneous effects of 
contract teachers by observable child and teacher characteristics. A F-test of insignificance of all 
the interaction terms is decisively rejected in both states; interactions between contract teachers 
and our observable characteristics have a significant effect on learning outcomes.  This shows 
that the contract teacher effect is heterogeneous with regards pupils and teacher characteristics.  
In both states male contract teachers are more effective than male regular teachers.  
Evaluating the effect at the mean ratio of male to female teachers, we find a positive male 
contract teacher effect relative to male regular teachers. In UP, male contract teachers are more 
effective than female regular teachers, while in Bihar they are not. This suggests that in UP the 
contract teacher effect completely mitigates the negative effect of being a male teacher, while in 
Bihar it reduces it, but male teachers (regardless of contractual type) are still less effective than 
female teachers.  This shows that the average treatment effect of having a contract teacher 
depends on the gender of the contract teacher.  
In UP, contract teachers have heterogeneous effects across children of differing health 
status, both in terms of child height and short term illness. Children with below average height 
and fathers with below average levels of education have positive treatment effects from having a 
contract teacher in UP. This may suggest that contract teachers reduce the negative impact of 
coming from families with lower SES. In Bihar, we find differential treatment effects of contract 25 
 
teachers with relation to children taking private tuition. Given that time-on-task is substantially 
lower in Bihar than UP (with teachers spending approximately 111 minutes teaching compared 
to 187 in UP), private tuition is far more pervasive, being undertaken by 40% of our sample of 
Bihar children. It appears that having a contract teacher narrows the achievement gap between 
those who take private tuition and those who do not.  
In both states contract teachers appear to mitigate the effects – on test scores – of being 
from a disadvantaged background, be it having below averagely educated father (in UP), health 
problems (in UP) or not being able to take private tuition (Bihar).  This is consistent with the fact 
that contract teachers are closer in terms of social standing to their pupils. Regular teachers, who 
enjoy salaries far above the average earnings in the areas they teach in, may consider under-
privileged pupils less capable, and may neglect struggling students. The findings that contract 
teachers benefit weaker or lower-achieving children are supported by descriptive data from the 
teacher questionnaire based on teachers’ opinions. The results (not presented) show that regular 
teachers are 7 percentage points more likely (than contract teachers) to agree ‘fully’ or agree 
‘quite a lot’ with the statement that ‘schedule caste and schedule tribe children are generally less 
attentive or less motivated towards studies than other children’, and this difference between 
regular and contract teachers’ opinions is statistically significant at the 6% level of significance. 
The saturated model suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity in the effects of 
contract teachers across pupil and teacher types. Most notably, the contract teacher effect is 
dependent on the gender of the contract teacher and the socio-economic status of pupils. This 
suggests that while the average pupil in the average school will neither benefit nor suffer from 
being taught by a contract teacher, he/she will gain if he/she is of below average socio-economic 
status and if the contract teacher is male. 26 
 
5  The relative cost of contract teachers 
The previous sections have focussed on the relative effectiveness of regular and contract 
teachers. However, this is only one half of the discussion. To complete the picture we shift our 
attention to the remuneration of teachers and calculate the ‘teacher salary cost per achievement 
point’. Our estimations suggest that pupils with contract teachers score 0.21 SD higher in Uttar 
Pradesh, and 0.063 SD higher in Bihar. This translates into an average absolute-score increase of 
8.4 marks in UP and 3.7 marks in Bihar. Our estimations predict that the average student taught 
by a regular teacher would score 25.5 marks in UP (63.4 marks in Bihar), while the average 
student taught by a contract teacher would score 33.9 marks in UP (67.1 marks in Bihar). Thus 
being taught by a contract teacher leads to a 33% increase in marks in UP and a 6% increase in 
marks in Bihar, compared to being taught by a regular teacher.  
To illustrate this point, Table 10 shows the relative cost per achievement point, of regular 
and contract teachers in each state. The ratio of regular teacher pay to contract teacher pay is 
3.97 in UP and 2.65 in Bihar. However, when we calculate the cost per predicted achievement 
point (taken from the average child taught by each teacher type), this ratio increases to 5.27 in 
UP and 2.80 in Bihar. So UP’s raw ratio of regular: contract teacher costs (3.97) increases to a 
standardized ratio of 5.27  when we consider the true cost (in terms of cost-per-predicted-
achievement point). This cost disadvantage of regular teachers holds over the entire range of the 
95% confidence interval of our estimates, with the regular : contract ratio of costs per 
achievement point ranging from 4.93 - 5.70 in UP, and from 2.73 – 2.88 in Bihar 
It may be that regular teachers are paid higher than contract teachers to reward them for 
other favourable characteristics. For a more accurate comparison, the influence of these 
characteristics must be taken into account.  Table  11  reports OLS  and School-Fixed effects 27 
 
regressions of the log of teacher pay. We use as controls the teacher characteristics used in the 
achievement production functions earlier, but the results are robust to additional controls for 
teachers’  caste and religion. We use data from government primary schools only, as in the 
achievement analysis in the rest of the paper.  
Our model has high explanatory power. The average achievement level of children in the 
school is an insignificant determinant of teacher salaries in both states, highlighting the absence 
of performance related pay. The age earnings profile is twice as steep in Bihar as in UP. In the 
main, age and teacher type are the only significant determinants of teacher salary in these public 
sector schools. In neither state are there wage returns to educational qualifications, despite the 
positive influence they have on achievement. In all estimates the coefficient on male gender is 
positive and around 5-6%, though the effect is only significant for Bihar. This positive 
coefficient contrasts with the consistently significant negative coefficient we find for the effect 
of male teachers on achievement. In Bihar we find that teacher training yields a wage return of 
8%, even though it is uncorrelated with higher child achievement (Table 5) and may even lower 
achievement (footnote 7).  
Contract teachers are paid far less in both states even after controlling for characteristics 
(i.e. when we compare regular and contract teachers of the same age, gender and qualifications). 
In UP the ceteris paribus contract teacher wage is approximately 33% of the regular teacher’s 
wage and in Bihar it is approximately 56%
18
                                                 
18 This is calculated by taking the exponential of the regular teacher’s wage (given by the constant) and the contract 
teacher’s wage (constant minus the contract teacher effect). This is likely to be an underestimate, as contract 
teachers are younger than regular teachers. After taking this into account the ratio is 3.59 in UP.  
. This translates to regular teachers earning 3.06 
times more than (otherwise comparable) contract teachers in UP, and 1.78 times more in Bihar.    28 
 
The structure of teacher pay in the government school sector is inefficient since it does 
not reward teachers for possessing characteristics that raise learning (in achievement equations). 
Female teachers are paid less despite raising student achievement, trained teachers are rewarded 
with higher pay despite no increase in student achievement from teacher training, and there is no 
performance related pay: teachers are not paid more if their students have higher achievement 
This is compounded by the fact that contract teachers are seriously underpaid relative to regular 
teachers of the same observed characteristics, despite producing higher pupil achievement. 
6  Conclusions 
This paper sought to measure the relative effectiveness and costs of regular and contract 
teachers in two Indian states. We used a number of models of the education production function 
to identify the causal effect of contract teachers. In all models we find that contract teachers do 
no worse than regular teachers, and indeed may be more effective than regular teachers. There is 
no evidence that the contract teacher effect is a class-size effect, i.e. that contract teachers appear 
more effective because they work with smaller classes or mono-grade classes.   
Contract teachers are generally more likely to teach in more deprived schools and this 
may lead to an incorrect conclusion regarding their effectiveness. After controlling for all school 
factors (in a school Fixed Effects regression) as well as for a rich array of pupil and teacher 
characteristics, contract teachers in UP are more effective than regular teachers. A plausible 
reason why contract teachers apply greater effort than regular teachers is due to the insecure 
annually-renewable nature of their contracts, i.e. the strong accountability pressure they face. 
Given this uncertainty they are liable to exhibit more effort, which could lead to higher child 
outcomes. However, the fact that much of the contract teacher effect remains even after we take 29 
 
their lower absence rates into account suggests that they apply greater effort in dimensions other 
than being present in school and the other dimensions of effort captured here.   
In Bihar, contract teachers do not face strong accountability
19
One explanation of the positive contract teacher effect could be that persons who become 
contract teachers are of a different type than regular teachers; for example, the far lower salaries 
of contract teachers may imply that only persons intrinsically motivated towards teaching 
children take these low paid jobs, whereas regular teachers are individuals attracted more by the 
high salaries of regular teacher posts but have less intrinsic motivation for teaching.  
, yet are still no less 
effective (indeed are weakly more effective) than regular teachers. This holds irrespective of the 
type of contract teacher. This shows that it is something intrinsic in the contracting of para 
teachers that leads them to be equally or more effective than regular teachers, despite their lack 
of training and experience, and their far lower pay. In Bihar, there is a clause in contract teacher 
contracts saying that appointments can be reviewed three years after first appointment, creating 
some weak accountability pressures. While these pressures are clearly not strong enough to elicit 
a difference in contract teachers’ school attendance habits, they may lead to an increase in effort-
levels in dimensions that were not captured in our data.  
A saturated model suggests that part of the contract teacher effect is due to contract 
teachers mitigating the negative effects of children being socially disadvantaged, possibly due to 
the lesser ‘social distance’ between contract teachers and their pupils, relative to the much more 
highly-paid regular teachers. This is supported by the fact that contract teachers devote more 
time supporting weak children in schools.  In conjunction with the fact that contract teachers live 
closer to school, this may induce more effort by making teachers more accountable to parents. 
                                                 
19 At least in the year of the survey (2007-08) they did not. In July 2009, the Bihar state government announced that 
it would test contract teachers before re-confirming their jobs. Teachers would have to gain at least 45% marks in 
the test to be reconfirmed in their jobs. As of Spring 2010, all Bihar contract teachers’ jobs have been re-confirmed. 30 
 
That contract teachers are less socially-distant from their students is supported by evidence in 
Kingdon (2010) which estimates that in 2005 the ratio of regular teacher pay to state per capita 
income in UP was 7.3, i.e. regular teachers are 7 times as well off as the average student they 
teach, a great economic distance, which is likely to be even greater in rural UP since rural per 
capita incomes are around one-third of urban incomes. Kingdon concludes that “When teachers 
are so much better-off than the students, they can look down on students with disdain since 
children in government schools typically come from poorer than average backgrounds in any 
case, and may come to school shabby, unclean and underfed”. Para teachers who are paid a 
quarter as much as regular teachers in UP are closer to their students, in terms of their socio-
economic background. 
The saturated model also suggests that the positive contract teacher effect is partly due 
the ‘para’ teacher contracts making male teachers noticeably more effective (likely a product of 
renewable contracts).  
Apart from being more effective in imparting learning than regular teachers, contract 
teachers also offer far better value-for money. Using raw-salary differentials, regular teachers 
have a cost per predicted achievement point that is 5.27 times higher than contract teachers in UP 
and 2.80 times higher than contract teachers in Bihar. Even after controlling for other wage-
determining characteristics, contract teachers are paid just 33% of a regular teacher’s wage in 
UP, and 56% of the regular wage in Bihar, a fact at odds with our conclusions regarding their 
relative effectiveness.  31 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of teachers, by state and teacher type 
 
UP  Bihar 
  Regular  Contract  t-test of 





Male  0.49  0.52  -0.31  0.84  0.55  -3.90*** 
Age in years  44.35  27.09  -11.88***  42.05  29.27  -10.33*** 
Tenure  6.47  3.29  - 4.62***  6.73  2.71  -2.82*** 
Salary (Rs per month)  11163  2988  -26.52**  10636  4195  -18.06** 
Education and Training 
BA degree  0.23  0.49  2.91***  0.27  0.34  1.01 
MA degree  0.30  0.19  -1.45  0.30  0.07  -4.52*** 
First Division  0.16  0.16  0.02  0.23  0.55  4.13*** 
Received training  0.95  0.34  -8.01***  0.84  0.39  -6.29*** 
Teacher Effort 
Absence rate  0.23  0.11  -3.07***  0.16  0.21  1.70* 
Proportion of the 
working day teaching  0.75  0.84  2.82***  0.76  0.84  -2.41*** 
Supports weak 
students  0.08  0.15  1.14  0.16  0.32  2.30** 
Note: Tenure is the number of years a teacher has worked at the current school. First Division indicates 
whether the teacher passed her/his Higher Secondary examinations with First Division marks (yes=1, no=0) 
‘Proportion of the working day teaching’ is the teacher’s self-report of the proportion of the typical school 
day that she/he spends in teaching (as opposed to non-teaching) activities.  This table reports the 
characteristics of teachers that teach grades 2 and 4, and not of all teachers of grades 1 through 5 in 
SchoolTELLS survey’s sample schools. Hence these mean characteristics may differ somewhat from those 
reported elsewhere, e.g. in Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao (2010).   35 
 
Table 2: Achievement Production Function, Uttar Pradesh 
 
  OLS 
 
School Fixed Effects 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  No teacher controls  Teacher controls  No teacher controls  Teacher controls 
Grade 4  0.447
*** 0.406  
(0.0847) 
*** 0.508  
(0.0932) 







* 0.0512  
(0.0243) 
* 0.0587  
(0.0256) 







*** 0.323  
(0.0374) 
*** 0.324  
(0.0354) 




  Child Characteristics       
Age in years   0.0307 
(0.0189) 
0.0390
** 0.0650  
(0.0176) 







*** 0.155  
(0.0459) 
*** 0.157  
(0.0407) 







*** 0.0162  
(0.00263) 
*** 0.0131  
(0.00241) 







* -0.0958  
(0.0350) 
*** -0.0882  
(0.0299) 







*** 0.0259  
(0.00531) 
*** 0.0215  
(0.00511) 







*** 0.0271  
(0.00812) 
*** 0.0284  
(0.00812) 
*** 0.0281  
(0.00414) 
***




*** 0.0464  
(0.0231) 
* 0.0296  
(0.0233) 







** 0.257  
(0.0919) 
*** 0.269  
(0.0788) 




  Teacher characteristics       

































































  School characteristics       


































Pupils  2330  2330  2330  2330 
N  8185  8165  8185  8185 
No. of schools      62  62 
R 0.252 
2  0.290  0.275  0.280 
Notes: Model also includes dummies for missing observations in parental education, private tuition and 
child health. OLS regressions control for clustering within schools and for heteroskedasticity. Constant 
included but not shown   36 
 
Table 3: Achievement Production Function, Uttar Pradesh: 
School Fixed Effects, by subject and by grade  
 
  School FE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Both grades (2 and 4) 
 
Grade 4 Only 
Both Subjects  Maths only  Reading only      Both Subjects 
Grade 4  0.536
*** 0.546  
(0.0327) 
*** 0.547  
(0.0551) 
***











Survey number  0.325
*** 0.312  
(0.0187) 
*** 0.338  
(0.0286) 




  Child characteristics       
Age in years  0.0683
*** 0.0611  
(0.00831) 
*** 0.0743  
(0.0128) 







*** 0.0748  
(0.0189) 
*** 0.225  
(0.0289) 







*** 0.0120  
(0.00121) 
*** 0.0142  
(0.00186) 







*** -0.101  
(0.0190) 
*** -0.0846  
(0.0291) 







*** 0.0242  
(0.00255) 
*** 0.0182  
(0.00391) 







*** 0.0294  
(0.00413) 
*** 0.0273  
(0.00635) 
*** 0.0427  
(0.00524) 
***




*** 0.0338  
(0.0122) 






Takes tuition  0.270
*** 0.306  
(0.0475) 
*** 0.231  
(0.0733) 




  Teacher 
Characteristics       
Contract teacher  0.208
*** 0.163  
(0.0486) 







*** 0.0119  
(0.00193) 







*** -0.155  
(0.0286) 

























First Division  0.153
*** 0.151  
(0.0396) 






N  8185  4129  4056  3733 
No. of schools  62  62  61  61 
R 0.280 
2  0.252  0.327  0.0316 
Notes: Model also includes dummies for missing observations in parental education, private tuition and 
child health. Constant included but not shown. SE statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.0137 
 
Table 4: Achievement Production Function, Bihar 
 
  OLS (across-school) 
 
School Fixed Effects 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  no teacher controls  teacher controls  no teacher controls  teacher controls 
Grade 4  0.931
*** 0.925  
(0.0554) 
*** 1.023  
(0.0617) 







*** 0.176  
(0.0240) 
*** 0.187  
(0.0259) 







*** 0.276  
(0.0224) 
*** 0.288  
(0.0224) 




  Child characteristics       
Age in years  0.0352
** 0.0358  
(0.0141) 
** 0.0218  
(0.0137) 







*** 0.269  
(0.0365) 
*** 0.258  
(0.0374) 















Illness   -0.0646
** -0.0731  
(0.0291) 
*** -0.0560  
(0.0275) 









* 0.0133  
(0.00543) 







*** 0.0268  
(0.00752) 
*** 0.0239  
(0.00752) 
*** 0.0237  
(0.00354) 
***




*** 0.0778  
(0.0244) 
*** 0.0637  
(0.0234) 







*** 0.279  
(0.0419) 
*** 0.187  
(0.0407) 




  Teacher characteristics       

























































  School characteristics       
































Pupils  2003  2003  2003  2003 
N  6774  6678  6774  6774 
No. of schools      71  71 
R 0.362 
2  0.362  0.360  0.362 
Notes: Model also includes dummies for missing observations in parental education, private tuition and child health. 





Table 5: Achievement Production Function Bihar – School Fixed Effects, by subject and by grade 
  School FE 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Both grades (2 and 4)  Grade 2 only 
 
Grade 4 only 
Both 
Subjects  Maths only  Reading only  Both Subjects  Both Subjects 
Grade 4 
1.035
*** 1.144  
(0.0275) 
*** 0.905  
(0.0455) 


















*** 0.289  
(0.0197) 
*** 0.284  
(0.0302) 
*** 0.326  
(0.0247) 




  Child characteristics         














*** 0.214  
(0.0198) 
*** 0.300  
(0.0303) 
*** 0.211  
(0.0250) 


















*** -0.0573  
(0.0195) 












*** 0.0156  
(0.00272) 
*** 0.0110  
(0.00417) 
*** 0.0117  
(0.00343) 







*** 0.0260  
(0.00354) 
*** 0.0217  
(0.00544) 
*** 0.0141  
(0.00445) 
*** 0.0371  
(0.00405) 
***




*** 0.0656  
(0.0128) 
*** 0.0604  
(0.0194) 
*** 0.0565  
(0.0163) 







*** 0.184  
(0.0219) 
*** 0.201  
(0.0337) 
*** 0.155  
(0.0276) 




  Teacher Characteristics         
Contract teacher  0.0688







































































6774  3465  3309  3595  3179 
Number of groups  71  69  70  1038  1038 
R 0.362 
2  0.335  0.396  0.0832     0.0036 
Notes: Model also includes dummies for missing observations in parental education, private tuition and child health. 
Constant included but not shown.    39 
 
 




  PTR Official  PTR Actual  Multi-grade teaching 
Number of contract 









  PTR Official  PTR Actual  Multi-grade teaching 
Number of contract 









Note: Correlations evaluated using information from all four visits. Notes: Spearman’s rank correlations shown, p-
values in brackets 
 
   40 
 
 
Table 7: Achievement Production Function: School FE and Value-Added Model, controls for pupil-teacher 





School FE Value Added Model 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Contract teacher  0.208
*** 0.203  
(0.0486) 
*** 0.217  
(0.0487) 
*** 0.208  
(0.0486) 
** 0.239  
(0.0806) 

































Pupils  2330  2330  2330  2053  2053  2053 
N  8185  8165  8185  3942  3942  3942 
No. of schools        62  62  62 
R 0.289 




* 0.0758  
(0.0358) 




































Pupils  2003  2003  2003  1819  1819  1819 
N  6774  6678  6774  3317  3317  3317 
No. of schools        71  71  71 
R 0.364 
2  0.362  0.365  0.0200  0.0179  0.0193 
 
Note: All equations control for teacher, child and home background characteristics but these are not shown. Constant 
included but not shown. se statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01   41 
 
 
Table 8: Achievement Production Function: School FE with controls for teacher effort and teaching style, 
Uttar Pradesh 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 


























































































2330  2330  2330  2330  2330  2330  2330 
N  8185  8185  8185  8185  8185  8185  8185 
No. of schools  62  62  62  62  62  62  62 
R 0.280 
2  0.278  0.280  0.278  0.280  0.279  0.281 
 
Note: All equations control for teacher, child and home background characteristics but these are not shown. “Time 
on task” is a composite index measuring the teacher’s self-reported percentage of time devoted to teaching, prayer 
assembly, supervision of games and preparation for teaching. “Support weak pupils” is defined as having spent 
special time to help weak children in at least eight of the last ten days. 42 
 
Table 9: Saturated School Fixed Effects Model with Contract teacher interactions 
 
  Uttar Pradesh  Bihar 
  Regular 
Teachers 
Additional 





interaction effect of 
Contract teacher 
Grade 4  0.232
*** 0.237  
(0.0727) 
*** 0.945  
(0.0863) 









*** 0.275  
(0.0407) 







*** -0.135  
(0.0349) 






  Child characteristics       













** 0.0932  
(0.0349) 






Height (cm)  0.0183
*** -0.00718  
(0.00209) 
*** -0.00415  
(0.00250) 















Father’s education  0.0307
*** -0.0146  
(0.00448) 



































  Teacher characteristics       
Age   0.0112









*** 0.370  
(0.0503) 
*** -0.231  
(0.0591) 

































Contract teacher  0.0265 
(0.0627) 
  0.0445 
(0.0499) 
 
_cons  -0.0538 
(0.0579) 
  -0.00964 
(0.0464) 
 
N  8185  6774 
No. of groups  62  71 
R 0.288 
2  0.366 
F_diff all characteristics  6.855  2.351 
P_diff all characteristics  3.96e-20***  0.000462*** 
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Table 10: The relative cost of regular and para teachers 
 



















(f = d/e) 
Average Salary (Rupees)  11843  2985  3.97  11194  4232  2.65 
Predicted Mean Achievement 
Score  25.49  33.88  0.75  63.37  67.11  0.94 
Cost per predicted 
achievement point 
(Rupees) 
464  88  5.27  176  63  2.80 
95% confidence interval of 

















0.92 - 0.97 
95 % CI of Cost per predicted 
achievement point 
(Rupees) 
418 – 522  84 - 91  4.93 - 5.70  168 -185  61-64  2.73-2.88 
Notes: Predicted mean achievement score is calculated following the School Fixed Effects regression of (column 
4) in table 2, holding all variables at their means with the exception of contract teacher. 
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Table 11: Teacher pay equations 
Dependent variable Log of Monthly Pay (Rupees) 
 
  UP  Bihar 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  OLS  OLS  School FE  OLS  OLS   School FE 







** 0.0613  
(2.36) 







*** 0.00994  
(3.92) 
*** 0.00998  
(3.69) 
*** 0.0195  
(3.92) 
*** 0.0195  
(12.43) 

















































*** 0.0935  
(3.22) 







*** -1.108  
(-17.42) 
*** -1.117  
(-16.53) 
*** -0.575  
(-17.42) 
*** -0.572  
(-17.27) 





















*** 8.662  
(51.42) 
*** 8.712  
(47.70) 
*** 8.225  
(51.42) 
*** 8.220  
(87.48) 






208  198  208  392  389  392 
No. of schools      63      71 
R 0.851 
2  0.845    0.826  0.826   
Ceteris paribus Salary 
Ratio 
(Regular/Contract)  
    3.06      1.78 
Ceteris paribus Salary 
Gap  
(Regular – Contract) 
    4087      1605 45 
 
 
Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables 
  UP  Bihar 
Variable  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
  Child characteristics       
Math Score  31.05  43.20  62.40  58.16 
Reading Score  32.71  37.39  69.36  49.39 
Male   0.50  0.50  0.54  0.50 
Age in years  8.79  1.70  9.09  1.63 
Weight (log)  9.26  2.51  9.50  2.26 
Height (cm)  121.94  10.66  127.08  10.60 
Illness*   0.41  0.49  0.48  0.50 
Father’s education (years)  3.48  4.38  4.41  4.80 
Mother’s education (years)  0.91  2.41  1.68  3.30 
Asset index (log) 1.20 
 1  0.97  1.11  0.99 
Takes private tuition  0.04  0.20  0.40  0.49 
  Teacher characteristics       
Age   32.50  11.18  32.30  9.38 
Male  0.51  0.50  0.59  0.49 
BA qualification  0.38  0.49  0.31  0.46 
MA qualification  0.22  0.41  0.12  0.33 
First division  0.17  0.38  0.47  0.50 
Contract teacher  0.71  0.46  0.73  0.44 
Absence rate  0.12  0.18  0.20  0.20 
  School characteristics       
School resources index 6.85 
2  1.31  4.82  1.24 
Pupil Teacher ratio 35.38 
3  16.35  34.30  13.13 
Textbook ratio 0.79 
4  0.23  0.63  0.23 
Always get a mid-day meal  0.81  0.39  0.04  0.19 
Note:  * Was ill enough to take 4 or more consecutive days off school in past 3 months.  Note these are means of 
variables taken from the merged child, teacher, school dataset. Thus, teacher and school characteristics are 
effectively weighted by the number of grade 2 and 4 students in each school. Thus, the teacher absence rate is lower 
here than would appear to be the case in Table 1, because the schools with more  children (present) in grades 2 and 4 




The asset index is a composite index of the following items with following weightings: Charpai, bed, wallclock, 
chair and table – enter directly; fan, bicycle, cd player and radio – multiply by 2; B&W TV, gas stove, cooker, 
mobile and telephone- multiply by 3; colour tv, fridge or motorbike- multiply by 5. 
2
 
 The school resource index incorporates information on not only the availability of resources, but whether or not 
they are in working order. It includes the following items;  table for the teacher, existence of a fan, ability to open 
windows, blackboard that can be written on with chalk, mat or jute for children to sit on, desk for the majority of 
children, a library, a working tape-recorder, working electricity, a boundary wall,  drinkable water and a working 
toilet. 
3 The pupil-teacher ratio was calculated taking into account the fluidity of class-room arrangements in the schools. It 
explicitly accounts for multi-grade teaching, and is measured by the total-number of pupils within the class, 
irrespective of grade.  
4 The textbook ratio is the number of children with a textbook for each subject, divided by the number of pupils in 
the class. 46 
 
Appendix 2  
Saturated Model 
 
For the saturated model we adapt Derecho and Glewwe (2002). We take a production function of 
the form, 
Tijs = hs(SCj, TCk, FCi) + εijs
 
      (1) 
Where Tijks 
And  SC
denotes the test score of child i, in school j, with teacher k in subject s; 
j 
And TC
denotes the vector of school characteristics; 
k  
And FC
denotes the vector of teacher characteristics; 
i 
ε
 denotes the vector of child and household characteristics. 
ijks
and estimate a linear approximation of (1) using a Taylor Approximation; 
      is defined to incorporate random noise that is uncorrelated with SC, TC and FC.  
 
Tijk = β0 + β1′SCj + β2′TCk +β3′FCi + β4′SCj⊗TCk + β5′SCj⊗FCi+β6′TCk⊗FCi + β7′SCj⊗TCk⊗FCi + 
εijk 
 
     (2) 
Where SCj⊗TCk
 
 denotes the interaction between school and teacher characteristics and so on and 
so forth.  
We wish to know the effect on test scores of being taught by a contract teacher as opposed to a 
regular teacher. Defining a typical contract teacher as a weighted average of all the characteristics 
of contract teachers, where the weights are the proportion of children taught by that teacher: 
p TC = ∑
∈P j
wjpTCk    




is the fraction of total children taught by contract 
teachers. Similarly the vector of characteristics for the typical regular teacher can be defined as: 
=∑
∈R j
wjrTCk    
Inserting (3) into (2) we can derive the expected test score of child i if he/she is taught by a contract 
teacher 
(4) 
E[Ti| TCk, contract teacher] =  β0 + β1′SCj + β2 p TC ′  +β3′FCi + β4′SCj p TC ⊗  + β5′SCj⊗FCi+β6 p TC ′ ⊗FCi 





And inserting (4) into (2) we can derive the expected test score of child i if he/she is taught by a 
regular teacher.  
E[Ti| TCk, regular-teacher] =  β0 + β1′SCj + β2 r TC ′  +β3′FCi + β4′SCj r TC ⊗  + β5′SCj⊗FCi+β6 r TC ′
⊗FCi +β7′SCj r TC ⊗ ⊗FCi
 
     (6) 
If we then normalize all SC, TC and FC variables to have means equal to zero, then we are left 
with  
β0 + β2 p TC ′   = expected test score of average child with average contract teacher in average school 
 
β0 + β2 r TC ′   = expected test score of average child with average regular teacher in average school 
 
We are interested in the expected change in test scores by switching from having a regular 
teacher to a contract teacher. That is  
β2′ (TCp – TCr
 
)    (7) 
Which we can estimate through regression analysis using a conventional dummy variable, Dc = 1 if 
a child is taught by a contract teacher, and Dc = 0 if the child is taught by a regular teacher. If 
children are assigned to contract teachers randomly, then we can simply estimate an OLS 
regression with this dummy variable and we would have an estimate of the contract teacher effect. 
Unfortunately we know that this isn’t the case, and that contract teachers are non-randomly 
assigned to schools. We can overcome this problem by estimating the model using school-fixed 
effects, whereby identification of Dc 
T
comes from within-school variation in teacher types – that is 
variations in test scores within a school dependent on teacher type. This reduces our model to   
ik = β0 + β1TCk + β2FCi + β3TCkFCi + εij
Which we can estimate using the dummy variable D
    (8) 
c 
T
in the following equation  
ij = (β0 + β1 r TC ) + β1 p TC (  -  r TC )Dc + (β2 + β3 r TC )FCi + β3 p TC (  -  r TC )DcFCi+ εij  (9) 48 
 
Appendix 3: Achievement Production Function with controls for teacher training 
 
  UP  Bihar 
  OLS  School FE  OLS  School FE 
Grade 4  0.404
*** 0.538  
(4.29) 
*** 0.910  
(16.49) 







* 0.0657  
(1.98) 
*** 0.176  
(3.64) 







*** 0.327  
(9.19) 
*** 0.277  
(17.50) 




  Child characteristics       
Age in years  0.0398
** 0.0713  
(2.16) 
*** 0.0334  
(8.58) 







*** 0.144  
(3.74) 
*** 0.264  
(7.61) 







*** 0.0127  
(6.65) 






Illness   -0.0943
*** -0.0911  
(-3.05) 
*** -0.0778  
(-4.81) 







*** 0.0211  
(5.12) 
*** 0.00964  
(8.29) 







*** 0.0278  
(3.33) 
*** 0.0274  
(6.73) 
*** 0.0239  
(3.67) 
***




** 0.0329  
(2.01) 
*** 0.0769  
(2.70) 







*** 0.270  
(3.23) 
*** 0.270  
(5.69) 




  Teacher characteristics       
Age   0.0116

































































*** -0.174  
(-5.20) 




  School characteristics       



































Pupils  2330  2330  2003  2003 
N  8165  8185  6678  6774 
No. of schools    62    71 
R 0.290 





Appendix 4 : Differentiating by type of contract teacher, Bihar – School FE 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Contract  Contract with and 
without training 
Full differentiation 




























Contract teacher appointed  
 
(0.0443) 







F-test equal coefficients    0.000723  0.0982 
P-value    0.979  0.906 
N  6774  6774  6774 
No. of schools  71  71  71 
R 0.362 
2  0.362  0.362 
 
Note: The equations include all child, home background and teacher variables included in the previous achievement 
tables but we do not show the results. 